

CONFIDENTIAL

Executive Registry

82-12213

27 September 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED]
Chairman, Technology Transfer
Intelligence Committee

25X1

SUBJECT : Meeting with Frank Press and National
Academy of Science's Study Panel Members [REDACTED]

25X1

1. Dr. Frank Press, the President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and Dr. Dale Corson, President Emeritus of Cornell University and Chairman of the NAS's panel studying the problems existing between scientific communication and national security are meeting with you on 28 September to discuss the conclusions of their report. A number of the study findings and recommendations involve the Intelligence Community and they will want to be sure you are aware of those as well as seeking your endorsement for those recommendations that affect the IC (See Attachment A). Our comments on the study recommendations are presented in paragraph 6 of this memorandum. The study was requested by DoD and the Intelligence Community became involved through Admiral Inman's concern. The Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC) was assigned the task of representing the IC in the NAS study. [REDACTED]

25X1

2. The TTIC worked hard to provide Intelligence Community support to the Panel and to ensure that the information it received about technology transfer concerns and activities was accurate and persuasive. A number of briefings were provided the full Panel; two full days of briefings and discussions were held with the all-source cleared Sub-Panel; and TTIC staff and others (CIA, DIA, and the FBI) have worked closely with the NAS Panel staff to ensure that the resulting sections of the report were factually accurate, conveyed an accurate impression, and were sanitized to allow public distribution. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. The IC-related findings are contained in Chapter 1 of the NAS report (Attachment B) and the unclassified Annex (Attachment C) representing the findings of the all-source Sub-Panel's review. Although the IC analysts involved gave it their

..

C1 By [REDACTED]
Decl OADR

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

L-299

DCI
EXEC
REG

"best shot," they did not convince the majority of the Panel nor its Sub-Panel that US technology transfer loss from the campuses was a significant problem. The IC had no "smoking gun" examples involving universities and this more than anything undercut our arguments; a number of partial cases based on hard evidence associated with acquisitions or potential military applications were made but none completed the cycle from US university into Soviet weapon systems. [REDACTED]

25X1

4. In the final analysis the Panel concluded that there had been very little militarily significant technology losses from the US university community and that on balance the greater danger to US national security was suppression of academic communication not related Soviet Bloc acquisitions. The Panel did not accept the IC's partial case examples as representing analytical proof of the overall problem and they did not agree with our conclusions concerning the military value of the identified US university research to the Soviets. Possibly, and more seriously, the Panel members did not -- in my estimation -- fully appreciate the CI threat to the university faculty and student body convincingly presented by the FBI. Furthermore, the Panel rejected our analysis and forecast that Soviet Bloc acquisition efforts against universities are likely to increase in the future (Page 15, Tab B); in the long run this probably is the issue the Panel should have focused on rather than the historical pursuit of past losses. [REDACTED]

25X1

5. There are several other aspects of the NAS report that you should be aware of:

- There is a difference of opinion as to the significance to the Soviets of technologies that are transferred. Their report states: "The Panel concludes that information acquired through open communication or by means of espionage activities on US campuses may not often add substantially to the Soviet military capacity in the near term. The designers of Soviet military systems are conservative, and thus new scientific advances, whatever their origin, may not be readily adopted in military systems. Moreover, such information adopted in military systems is probably best understood by Soviet researchers, and it may not flow readily to Soviet military designers because of the highly secretive and compartmentalized nature of the Soviet military R&D and procurement process." We find this paragraph and the Panel's views about Soviet military technology to be naive.
- The NAS Study deals almost exclusively with technology transfer to the Soviets. The East European connection is hardly mentioned. The Chinese are just mentioned in passing. And, the Panel suggests that the Government fund some additional study re the Third World. All of

this does make some difference. For example, to the extent that the Government does try to "control" foreign Communist visitors, the controls are much more stringent in practice re the Soviets than for the EE, let alone for the Chinese. The other side of that coin is that access to critical US technologies is presumably much easier for the East Europeans.

- The NAS paper also deals largely with Government-sponsored research and Government-sponsored exchanges. While these from our view are problem areas, the more difficult problems are those where Government monies are not involved (e.g. with privately funded exchanges).

25X1

6. Panel Recommendations Although we may not agree fully with the Panel's overall findings, a number of the study recommendations are potentially helpful from our perspective (keyed to Attachment A):

- Voluntary Controls (Attachment A, p. 71) This recommendation essentially says try Admiral Inman's approach, in a selective manner.
- Staffing (p. 71) The Report calls for more and better intelligence assessments, a recommendation that can only be accomplished by the IC through analytical resource enhancement.
- Assessment Capability (p. 72) Again, the need for better IC analytical input is cited as a means of fulfilling this recommendation.
- Review of Scientific Exchange Proposals (p. 72) This recommendation calls for joint University-Intelligence Community efforts to raise the awareness of the Scientific Community to the problems of technology transfer loss. Furthermore, the Panel proposes establishment of an academic advisory group to TTIC/COMEX to facilitate more effective communication between Universities and appropriate federal agencies on the issue.

++ I RECOMMEND THAT YOU DIRECT ME AS CHAIRMAN OF TTIC TO BEGIN IC ACTIONS TO CARRY OUT THIS PANEL RECOMMENDATION IMMEDIATELY. AND, THAT YOU REQUEST DR. PRESS TO PROVIDE ME ASSISTANCE IN SELECTING APPROPRIATE UNIVERSITIES TO SERVE ON THE ADVISORY GROUP.

- Government University Forums (p.72 and 73) The recommendation includes the IC as part of the government representation. We believe this is a positive step and that the IC should be represented.
- Heightened Awareness (p. 73) The Panel's urging to the Scientific Community to voluntarily inform government officials concerning possible misuse of exchange programs may help [redacted] and the FBI in their efforts on university campuses -- we hope so.

25X1

One apparent flaw in the Panel's recommendations probably deserves comment: The report's recommendation appears to only focus on Soviet Scientific Exchanges (p. 73). The absence of reference to East European S&T exchanges in the recommendation section may convey an unintended message to the academic community. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]
Chairman
Technology Transfer Intelligence Community

P.S. The recent flap over the technical symposium of the Society of Phot-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE) may arise during the meeting so we have attached some background information on it (Attachment D). FYI - this was an "Open Conference." Export regulations do not apply (or more precisely, the "export" is covered under General License category GTDA). Visa controls are not directly used yet by the Government when there are "only" technology transfer concerns. The real lever available to the Government was money. Many of the speakers worked for the Government or were doing research under contract to Defense. Defense/Policy moved to use this lever, but the whole effort was so tardy as to create considerable disruption. Defense has to sort out its procedures for alerting State and Commerce when such conferences are coming and arranging for review of sensitive technical papers. COMEX was not directly involved in this incident.

..

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - Chairman NIC
1 - DDI
1 - EX REG (w/o attachment)
1 - TTIC Secretariat
1 - TTAC Chrono

OSWR/TTAC [REDACTED] (27 Sept 82)

25X1

Page Denied